The Silent LLC Revolution—The Social Cost of Academic Neglect
Howard M. Friedman*
The law of Business Associations usually develops slowly. The business forms
that dominated the business landscape until the end of the 20th century have been in
existence for hundreds of years.1 However, in the last decade a revolution has taken
place. The Limited liability Company has become the dominant form for newly-created
small businesses in a clear majority of the states, and is rivaling corporations for that
distinction in several more. Nationwide, over 45% of new businesses are LLCs.2 Yet
reading the legal literature, one would never suspect this.
Several years ago, Prof. John W. Lee published a study comparing the number of
corporations formed between 1995 and 1998 with the number of limited liability
companies formed in the same time period. He concluded that in those years, “in all but
one state new corporation formations … outnumber new LLC formations—usually by a
margin of 2:1 or 3:1 or greater.”3 As the statistics discussed in this article demonstrate,
at least by 2002, the picture changed dramatically.
The LLC revolution has not only occurred with lightening speed. Equally
interesting is the fact that the revolution has been carried forward primarily by
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practitioners.4 Law schools, law professors, law publishers, bar examiners and others
usually responsible for disseminating cutting edge developments have been surprisingly
absent from the playing field much of the time. In 2004, they remain in denial, acting as
if the general partnership were still the chief rival to the corporation. In the 21st century,
they still live in the 1990’s. In Part IV of this article I examine why this group of usual
early-adopters still remains in denial.
This article begins by examining the data—something that, except for Prof. Lee’s
article, has only occasionally been done in the academic literature.5 Next, I examine the
history of limited liability companies in the United States and explain why the LLC has
become such a popular business form. In Part III, I examine why this new business form
has failed to catch hold in a few key states. Part IV examines the absence of interest in
the LLC form by scholars, law schools, law publishers and bar examiners and attempts to
analyze why this is the case. Part V makes a plea for academics to focus on their
attention on limited liability companies and suggests some urgent topics for law reform
and their research agendas.
I.
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The Data
The International Association of Commercial Administrators collects data from
almost all states on the number of business filings made annually in each state.6 The
latest data set available is for 2003.7 That data, with other reports and data sources, allow
me to compile comparative statistics for all 50 states plus the District of Columbia. As
the following tables demonstrate, the growing predominance of LLCs was obvious by
2002, when they comprised a majority of new business filings in 19 states and made up
41.84% of business filings nationwide. By 2003, the predominance of LLCs was
unquestionable. In that year, more LLCs than corporations were formed in 29 states. In
11 other states where corporations predominated, over 45% of new business filings still
were for LLCs. In almost all the states, the percentage of businesses choosing the LLC
form increased from the prior year.
In the remaining eleven jurisdictions, while the use of LLCs increased,
corporations clearly were still the form of choice. In six states, this was overwhelmingly
so: in California, Florida, Illinois, New York, North Dakota and South Dakota, over twice
as many corporations as LLCs were formed in 2003. However, as will be discussed in
Part III, in many of these cases special peculiarities of state law or practice explain why
LLCs have not become more popular.
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Nationally, 45.44% of business filings in 2003 were for LLCs. If we exclude the
six states in which LLCs have clearly not become widely accepted, 53.72% of the
business filings in the remainder of the country were for LLCs.
The 29 States Where LLCs Predominate
(Domestic and Foreign Filings)
(See Appendix A for Details of Data)
State
% LLCs 2002
% LLCs 2003
Connecticut
81.50%
81.65%
Wisconsin
71.20%
75.61%
Louisiana
66.63%
72.53%
New Hampshire
64.11%
65.23%
Ohio
59.22%
65.23%
Arizona
60.84%
64.90%
Missouri
56.82%
63.73%
Michigan
55.22%
61.35%
Oregon
55.02%
61.19%
New Jersey
52.67%
60.73%
Delaware
56.22%
60.01%
New Mexico
53.92%
59.88%
Montana
N/A
59.20%
Kentucky
53.13%
58.53%
Alaska
46.86%
57.13%
Utah
52.27%
57.00%
South Carolina
51.03%
56.54%
Oklahoma
50.38%
55.67%
Mississippi
49.27%
55.32%
Alabama
47.98%
55.01%
Washington
50.23%
54.88%
Idaho
51.07%
54.77%
Kansas
48.22%
53.96%
Hawaii
48.34%
53.17%
Rhode Island
43.66%
52.33%
Maryland
45.07%
51.20%
Virginia
45.06%
50.85%
Iowa
44.81%
50.59%
Indiana
45.20%
50.14%

The 16 Jurisdictions Where LLCs Are Popular But Not Predominant
(Domestic and Foreign Filings)
(See Appendix A for Details of Data)
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State
Colorado
Vermont
Tennessee
Wyoming
West Virginia
Minnesota
Maine
Georgia
Arkansas
Nebraska
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
District of Columbia
Nevada
Massachusetts
Texas

State
New York
California
Illinois
Florida
South Dakota
North Dakota

% LLCs 2002
49.34%
52.69%
43.99%
44.67%
46.92%
37.33%
34.84%
40.72%
40.22%
39.13%
40.99%
37.58%
43.82%
35.18%
32.23%
36.66%

% LLCs 2003
50.00%
49.48%
48.24%
48.10%
47.84%
47.19%
46.84%
46.45%
46.00%
45.86%
45.50%
44.03%
43.89%
40.32%
40.13%
39.04%

6 States With Corporations = 2x LLCs
(Domestic and Foreign Filings)
(See Appendix A for Details of Data)
% LLCs 2002
29.19%
29.40%
25.23%
21.39%
17.47%
27.79%

% LLCs 2003
32.87%
32.58%
31.00%
27.08%
20.01%
14.56%

This data is not perfect. We would like to know the comparative number of
domestic corporations vs. domestic limited liability companies, i.e. the comparative
number of businesses that were formed under the law of each state. The IACA data lists
this for corporations. It then lists separately the number of foreign (out-of-state)
corporations that filed to qualify to do business in the state.8 For LLCs, the IACA data
combines the number of new LLCs formed in the state with the number of foreign LLCs
8
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that have filed to qualify to do business in the state. Thus some LLCs are counted more
than once—once in the state of formation and again in each foreign state in which it is
doing business. To make the data set out above comparable, I have compared the
combined LLC data with the combined numbers for domestic incorporations plus foreign
corporations qualifying to do business. This comparison very likely understates the
dominance of LLCs in new business formation. Larger businesses are more likely to
operate beyond their state of formation. The larger the business, the more likely it is to
be in corporate form. Stated another way, it is probable that a smaller percentage of
LLCs than corporations qualify to do business in a state outside their state of formation.
This is largely borne out by figures for those few states that elsewhere report in
more detail. In Kentucky in 2003, for example, 6,799 new corporations were formed,
while 2,360 foreign corporations filed. On the other hand, 11,878 new LLCs were
formed (almost 75% more LLCs that corporations), but only 1,050 foreign LLCs
qualified to do business in the state (55% fewer than the number of foreign corporation
filings).9 Similar data is available from Arizona. 13,075 domestic corporations were
formed and 2,483 foreign corporations qualified to do business in the state in 2003.
Compared to that, 27,056 domestic LLCs were formed and only 1,706 foreign LLCs
qualified to do business in the state.10 Interestingly, as might be expected, this pattern
may not hold true for the six states in which LLCs have not been wieldy accepted. In
Illinois, 18,772 domestic LLCs were formed in 2003, and 2,678 foreign LLCs qualified
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to do business in the state. In the same year 44,384 domestic corporations were formed,
and only 3,387 foreign corporations qualified to do business in Illinois.11
II.
The Limited Liability Company
A. An Introduction to LLCs
In order to understand the importance of limited liability companies one must step
back and survey broadly the forms that are available for conducting business.
Historically, the major choices for individuals going into business were the partnership
and the corporation. Choosing which of the two forms to use involved balancing
business considerations and tax factors. Partnerships sometimes offered the most
attractive federal income tax features; but business factors—particularly the lack of
limited liability in the partnership—often drove entrepreneurs to choose the corporate
form even for small businesses.12
In reality, the choice was not that stark. On the tax side, before the reduction of
personal income tax rates in 198613, corporate taxation was far from disadvantageous if
all profits were to be reinvested in the business.14 Earnings would be taxed at corporate
rates that were typically significantly lower than personal rates. The value of stock in the
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hands of shareholders would increase and eventually that gain would be taxed at low
capital gains rates or, if the stock was held until death, it would get a stepped-up basis
and the capital gains would not be taxed at all.15
Even if corporate earnings were to be distributed to investors, many small
corporations could elect to be taxed under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code
and receive some of the important benefits that are present in the tax treatment of
partnerships.16 Alternatively, without choosing Subchapter S, for corporations outside
certain personal service industries a portion of the corporation’s earnings could be
sheltered at the low rates applicable to the first $50,000 or $75,000 of corporate income.17
Shareholders could often limit the corporation’s earnings to that amount by taking the
rest as salary taxable to the shareholder-employee, but deductible by the corporation as a
business expense.18
On the other hand, choosing the partnership was not as disadvantageous from the
business perspective as the theory of limited liability might seem to suggest. In reality,
the owners of close corporations often were required to personally guarantee bank loans
and other major obligations of the corporation, eliminating their limited liability for the
most important of the business’ contractual obligations.19 When it came to tort claims,
15
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again the real world was more complex than theory. Since the shareholder-entrepreneur
often was a primary employee of the business, many of the torts chargeable to the
business would be committed, at least in part, by that owner. For those torts, the
shareholder-tortfeasor remained personally liable as do all tortfeasors.20 Finally, both
corporations and partnerships typically took out insurance to cover tort claims, so that the
real personal risk for tort liability to partners was only liability for the smaller universe of
claims that exceeded the policy limits of the business.21
Nevertheless, the standard choice between a general partnership and a corporation
was not optimal. Before the rise of LLCs, a number of intermediate forms of business
arose that went part of the way toward providing both partnership tax treatment and
limited liability. The limited partnership,22 the limited liability partnership,23 and the
limited liability limited partnership24 were all intermediate—albeit sometimes
cumbersome—forms. While these intermediate forms became popular in a few
specialized kinds of businesses25 and professional firms26, none of them became a
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widespread substitute for the corporation and partnership in the broad universe of small
business ventures.27 Only the limited liability company (LLC)—a hybrid melding the
corporation and the partnership-- gained that distinction. Yet some of the leading
academic literature and materials designed to educate law students—even that published
in 2002 or after—still give limited partnerships and limited liability partnerships equal or
superior billing to LLCs.28
The limited liability company, which came of age in the 1990’s, presented the
entrepreneurs of Generation X with their ultimate dream. With the LLC, they could have
it all—partnership tax, limited liability, and default rules more suited to the small
business than are the corporate default rules. Indeed this last point is often overlooked,
but it is an extremely important consideration in the use of LLCs.
Corporations were created primarily to facilitate the amassing of capital from
large numbers of investors.29 Corporate law developed both mandatory and default rules
designed to protect geographically dispersed passive investors from the shirking, selfCommodification, Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 1167
(2003).
27
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dealing and incompetence of those managing the pooled funds originally invested by
shareholders.30 A number of these rules are unsuited to the small business where there is
no separation of ownership and management. Annual election of managers31; the
requirement that decisions generally be made in formal meetings32; the requirement that
minutes of meetings be kept33; a separation of powers that give separate roles to owners,
day-to-day managers, and a board that sets policy and monitors management34; free
transferability of ownership interests in exchange for locking capital investment into the
business35—these are traps for unwary closely held business owners, not their protective
armor.
Partnership law, on the other hand, is designed for the business in which owners
are also managers. Its default rules facilitate the permanent appointment of managers,36
informal decision making,37 control over the identity of new co-owners,38 and the ability

30
See generally, I James D. Cox, Thomas Lee Hazen & F. Hodge O’Neal, CORPORATIONS, Chap 10 (1998)
(discussing duties of care and loyalty). Cf. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory
of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247 (1999) (role of directors is not to reduce agency costs, but to
encourage team production).
31

MBCA §8.03(c).
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the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 387 (2003); Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations,
(July 2004). UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 04-13. http://ssrn.com/abstract=567803.
36
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to withdraw capital in the event of disagreement with management decisions.39 These
features are the hallmark of small business needs in the real world. Of course, many of
the inconvenient corporate default rules could be changed through lawyering. Provisions
in articles and bylaws, shareholder agreements40 and buy-sell agreements can make the
corporation’s operating guidelines similar to those automatically available by default in
the partnership. An ill-fitting suit can be tailored to fit fairly well; but one that fits off the
rack is usually less costly and overall a better choice. Sometimes though, the color or
style of the ill-fitting suit is so attractive that extensive tailoring is appealing. Before
LLCs, many were willing to tailor the ill-fitting corporate cloak in order to get one
appealing feature that was unavailable in the partnership—limited liability.
The limited liability company offers the default rules of partnerships along with
limited liability. Moreover, at least beginning in 1997, all of this became available with
the advantage of partnership taxation to boot.41 Small businesses have flocked to the
LLC. Limited liability companies are also frequently used by larger businesses when
corporations wish to create wholly-owned subsidiaries. Just as the LLC is a convenient
vehicle for a single individual as an owner, so they are convenient for a single corporate
parent to use.42
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Uniform Partnership Act (1997), §801, §807.
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See MBCA §7.32.
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Effective Jan. 1, 1997, the Internal Revenue Service adopted the so-called “Check-the-Box” Regulations,
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B. The Invention of the LLC—A Practitioner-Driven Revolution While Academics Were
Looking In the Other Direction
Limited liability companies were not the invention of academic scholars. Indeed,
beginning in 1980 a number of scholars, using insights from the law and economics
movement, began to question the wisdom of limited liability. Many of these scholars
suggested that limited liability for torts caused corporations at the behest of their
shareholders to take excessive risks, knowing that the upside potential was unlimited
while downside exposure was limited to assets invested in the enterprise.43 This
academic interest in expanding personal liability of shareholders for torts committed by
their corporations peaked with a classic 1991 article by Professors Henry Hansmann and
Reinier Kraakman.44
But the expansion of personal liability for torts did not sit well with practicing
lawyers of that decade. 1991 was just the time at which unincorporated law and
accounting firms, plagued by their participation in the savings and loan scandal, began to
cry for protection from personal liability for malpractice claims.45 In that year, Texas
adopted the first Limited Liability Partnership law, allowing partners to shield themselves

43

E.g. Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90
Yale L. J. 1, 65-76 (1980); Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic
Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. Legal Studies 689, 714-28 (1985).

44
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100 Yale L.J. 1879 (1991).

45

Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present At the Birth (Nearly), 66 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 1065 (1995)
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from tort liability, but not contract, liability—the exact opposite of the policy that
academics were advocating.46
Just as intermediate forms like LLPs were impelled by lawyers “in the trenches”,
so were the first LLCs. Limited liability companies originated with practicing lawyers
representing specific clients. Prof. Susan Pace Hamill has traced the early history.47
Some individuals had, in the past, been involved in oil and gas exploration using a
Panamanian “Limitada”, a business form giving investors limited liability, but taxed as a
partnership under U.S. tax law. They asked their lawyers why there was not a similar
business form available under U.S. law. Their lawyers promptly set out to find a state
legislature that would create the business form for their clients. Initial attempts to
convince the Alaska legislature to do so failed in 1975 and 1976. Understanding,
however, that different states can be laboratories for experimentation, the lawyers moved
their efforts to Wyoming and, in 1977, succeeded. Wyoming enacted the first limited
liability company statute.48
This was only the first battle in the lawyers’ campaign for their clients. Next they
needed to obtain agreement of the Internal Revenue Service that the new Wyoming form
of business would receive partnership tax treatment. The lawyers embarked on a threeyear campaign to achieve this, in the process enlisting the aid of the Secretary of State
and Governor of Wyoming. Ultimately in 1980 the IRS issued a private letter ruling to

46

Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b, § 15 (1992). In 1997, the statute was amended to shield partners in Texas
LLPs from contract liability as well. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-3.08 (1998). The same full shield
was carried over into subsequent amendments of the statute. The most recent is Tex. Business
Organizations Code § 152.801 (eff. Jan 1, 2006).

47

Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 1459 (1998).

48

Id. At 1463-66.
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the Wyoming entrepreneurs that had begun the process, permitting them to create an LLC
that would be taxed as a partnership to take over the business of their Panama Limitada.49
This began an eight-year struggle between the IRS and practitioners over whether
or not to generally permit limited liability companies to be taxed as partnerships. As will
be discussed further below, in 1988 the IRS capitulated and issued Revenue Ruling 88-76
that permitted properly structured LLCs to be taxed under Subchapter K or the Internal
Revenue Code, the partnership tax provisions.50 During these eight years, however, legal
academics were uninvolved in debating this important question of tax and business
policy. A search of the Legal Resource Index reveals only four articles on limited
liability companies were published in United States legal periodicals before 1989. In
1981, a 3-page article was published in the Journal of Taxation.51 In 1983, a student
Comment was published in Florida State University Law Review52, and a 3-page article
was published in the Florida Bar Journal.53 Finally in 1988, another student Comment
was published in the Land and Water Law Review.54

49

Id. at 1466-67. See Private Ruling 8106082, 1980 PRL LEXIS 5766 (Nov. 18, 1980).

50

Revenue Ruling 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, discussed at ____ infra.

51

Frank M. Burke, Jr. & John S. Sessions, The Wyoming Limited Liability Company: An Alternative to Sub
S and Limited Partnerships?, 54 Jour. of Taxation 232 (1981). One of the authors, Frank M. Burke, was
the lawyer who led the battle for the enactment of Wyoming’s LLC statute. See Susan Pace Hammill,
supra. note __, at 1463.

52

Richard Johnson, The Limited Liability Company Act (Florida), 11 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 387 (1983).

53

Ernest A. Seemann, The Florida Limited Liability Company: A New Form of Business Association,57
Fla. Bar Jour. 536 (1983).

54

Joseph P. Fonfara & Corey R. McCool, The Wyoming Limited Liability Company: A Viable Alternative
to the S Corporation and the Limited Partnership?, 23 Land and Water L. Rev. 523 (1988).
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Without assurance of partnership tax treatment, Wyoming’s example did not
immediately catch on. In the decade of the 1980’s, only Florida followed suit.55 Florida
was apparently attempting to attract capital from Central and South America by
furnishing an entity similar to the Limitada that was familiar to residents of countries in
Latin America, many of whom had presumably made their way to Florida.56 Even the
issuance of Revenue Ruling 88-76 did not immediately provoke a widespread reaction.
But in 1990, beginning with a statute enacted in Colorado, the landscape changed.
Between 1990 and 1994, forty-five additional states adopted LLC statutes.57 Professor
Carol R. Goforth has published a detailed study of this fevered legislative activity and
reached a rather clear conclusion:
In virtually every state, those responsible for drafting and/or enacting LLC
legislation cite motives which relate to attracting business and revenue to the
state, or avoiding the loss of such business and revenues to other states. In many
instances, the speed with which LLC legislation has been implemented is due at
least in part to an express desire not to be left behind as neighboring or competing
jurisdictions authorized the new business form. In still other states, especially
those that were on the forefront of the trend, the express intent was to lead the
way in attracting new business to the state by authorizing the new form of entity
before other states.58

55

Susan Pace Hammill, supra. note __, at 1468-69.

56

Richard Johnson, supra. note __, at 387.
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In the 1990-1994 period, law professors became heavily involved in some of the
drafting of LLC statutes. In Colorado, the state that began the legislative explosion, a law
professor was one of the drafters of the legislation.59 In many states, legislative activity
was helped along by the American Bar Association. In 1990 the ABA began to draft a
prototype LLC statute, developed a clearinghouse to aid state LLC drafting committees,
and encouraged the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to begin to draft a Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act.60 A law professor was Reporter for the ten-person
drafting committee for the ABA’s Prototype Limited Liability Company Act.61 Law
professors were also well represented on the committee that developed the Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act62—a project that was completed in 199463 after nearly all
the states had already adopted their first LLC statutes. Nevertheless, in the trenches in
most jurisdictions, the state-specific drafting and the pressure for enactment of the state’s
limited liability company act was still largely the result of work by the practicing bar and
bar associations.64
The LLC is a hybrid, embodying some elements of the partnership form and other
elements that are normally aspects of the corporation. One of the most attractive features
59
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of the LLC is the ability, through essentially contractual arrangements, to make the LLC
more partnership-like or more corporate-like, depending on the needs of the owners. It
can have a single manager or be managed by all its members. Its membership interests
can be made freely transferable or their transfer can be limited. The LLC can be
designed to dissolve upon death or retirement of any member, or it can be given an
unlimited period of existence, unaffected by withdrawal of a member. State statutes
sometimes differ as to which of these are imposed by default and which need special
provisions in the LLC’s operating agreement in order to be realized. But they can all be
achieved.
Revenue Ruling 88-76 imposed significant limits on the type of LLCs that would
be taxed as a partnership rather than a corporation. The rules for determining whether an
entity would be taxed as a partnership or corporation that were in effect in 1988—the socalled Kintner Regulations65—were designed in response to attempts at an earlier time by
professional service firms to be classified as corporations so that they could get certain
tax-sheltered benefits for their employees which, particularly prior to 1982, were
unavailable to partners.66 So they favored treating entities as partnerships. The
regulations identified four factors that distinguished a corporation from a partnership:
limited liability, free transferability of ownership interests, centralized management,
perpetual life. An entity was required to have three of these four to be classified as a

65

See Patrick E. Hobbs, Entity Classification: The One Hundred-Year Debate, 44 Cath. U. L. Rev. 437,
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corporation. Conversely, so long as a business had at least two partnership-like
characteristics, it would be taxed as a partnership.
LLCs, of course, had limited liability. They could also be manager-managed; or
have freely transferable membership interests; or continue beyond the death or
withdrawal of one or more of their members. But they could have only one of these
additional corporate-like characteristics and still retain their partnership status for tax
purposes. This meant that in the period immediately after 1988, business owners could
not take full advantage of some of the flexibility of design that could make limited
liability companies so attractive. It was only in 1997 with the promulgation by the IRS of
the “Check-the-Box” rules that the full flexibility inherent in the LLC model could
flower.67 The Check-the-Box rules eliminated the tests used in the Kintner Regulations
and permitted LLCs to freely choose to be taxed as a partnership, even if they had been
structured to have all the characteristics that the Kintner Regulations ascribed to
corporations. Alternatively, should a company desire it, an LLC can choose to be taxed
as a corporation instead.
In the period immediately after 1988, lawyers were so obsessed with assuring that
LLCs would get partnership tax treatment that some states adopted so-called “bullet
proof” LLC statutes.68 These did not permit an LLC to be formed with more than one of
the additional corporate-like characteristics, just in case a lawyer did not otherwise know
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the rules. After 1997, virtually all the states with bullet proof statutes changed them into
statutes permitting greater flexibility in LLC structure.69
C. Why Are LLCs Really So Good?
The vast majority of business entities in the United States are small companies,
owned by one or a handful of investors. It is for these kinds of businesses that the LLC is
particularly well suited. It provides both tax and non-tax advantages over the alternative
business forms.
The LLC can replace the sole proprietorship with a business that shields an
individual’s personal assets from his or her business creditors. Originally a number of
states required an LLC to have at least two members. However in its 1997 Check the
Box Regulations, the Internal Revenue Services permitted a single-person LLC to elect to
be taxed as a sole proprietorship. That led states that previously were more restrictive to
amend their LLC statutes to permit single-member LLCs.70
The LLC can replace the general partnership with a business that furnishes all of
the advantages of the partnership, but also provides owners with limited liability. The
general partnership has essentially disappeared as a “lawyered” business form. General
partnerships that exist today are either holdovers from pre-LLC days or they are
businesses entered into informally without legal advice that by default are subjected to
the rules found in the Uniform Partnership Act.71 The once-elaborately drafted
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partnership agreement has gone the way of the buggy whip and slide rule. It has been
replaced by the LLC operating agreement.
1. Tax Advantages
The universally remarked upon tax advantage of the LLC over a traditional
corporation is the elimination of the double taxation of profits. In a corporation taxed
under the traditional rules of Internal Revenue Code Subchapter C, earnings are taxed to
the corporation in the year when they are realized. When those earnings are distributed
out to shareholders as dividends, they are taxed again to the shareholder, though since
2003 (and until 2009) usually at the same low rates that are applied to capital gains.72
Subchapter K, the partnership tax provisions, impose only a single tax. Earnings and
losses are passed through to the partner or LLC member in the year the business realizes
them, whether those earnings are reinvested in the business or are distributed out to the
business owners.73
Well before the development of the limited liability company, an alternative
method of obtaining both limited liability and pass-through taxation was available. This
was the Subchapter S corporation. A business formed under state law as a corporation
can elect to be taxed for federal income tax purposes under the special rules of IRC
Sections 1361- 1379. A Subchapter S election eliminates tax at the corporate level and
taxes shareholders on corporate earnings in the year they are realized, just as is done for
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partnerships. However, this is the only partnership-like treatment given by Subchapter S.
For other purposes, the corporate tax rules apply.
There are also some limiting requirements imposed by the Internal Revenue Code
for a corporation to be eligible to elect Subchapter S treatment. Some, like the
requirement that an S corporation may have no more than 75 shareholders74, have little
realistic impact on the small business. Prior to 1996, this number was 3575; however
even at that level, most small businesses qualified. Two other limits, however, do make
Subchapter S unattractive to some small businesses. First certain individuals and entities
may not hold shares in S corporations: non-resident aliens, other corporations and certain
trusts are the most important of these.76 Secondly, S corporations are limited in the
flexibility they have in raising capital. They may not issue preferred stock,77 despite the
fact that giving some equity investors a senior claim may be a useful technique to attract
capital to a small business. LLCs are unconstrained in selecting who their investors will
be or in creating flexible financing arrangements.
It is in areas of taxation beyond the pass-through of earnings and losses
that the LLC may be a more important choice, for these tax advantages cannot be
replicated by using the S corporation.78 These differences span the life of the business,
from initial investment to sharing in earnings, to liquidation.
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If an investor acquires stock in an S corporation in exchange for property that has
appreciated in value since the investor originally acquired it, the exchange of property for
stock will be tax free only if the investor and other investors who transferred property at
the same time end up owning at least 80% of the corporation’s stock.79 An investor can
transfer appreciated property in exchange for an LLC membership interest without
paying tax on the property’s increased value, regardless of how small an interest in the
LLC the investor and other property transferors end up with.80
In an S corporation, required to have one class of stock, all earnings are shared
strictly in proportion to the number of shares held by each investor. One of the most
important tax benefits of an LLC is the ability to create “special allocations” that pass
through different sorts of income, losses or tax credits to different partners. For example,
capital gains or depreciation deductions may be allocated disproportionately to one
partner. In order to prevent tax evasion, there are complex limits on the extent to which
special allocations will be recognized for tax purposes. Allocations that are not in
accordance with the partner’s interest in the partnership are valid only if they have
“substantial economic effect”81, a term that is elaborately defined in the regulations
promulgated under §704 of the Internal Revenue Code.82

and Subchapter S: Classification Issues Revisited, 60 Univ. Cincinnati L. Rev. 1083 (1992). Comparisons
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Losses, as well as gains, are passed through to the tax returns of individual
investors in both S corporations and LLCs. However, losses can be deducted only up to
an amount equal to the tax basis of the investor’s stock or membership interest.83 In an
LLC, the investor’s basis will be increased (permitting more losses to be deducted) in
situations in which the investor’s basis in S corporation stock would not be increased. In
particular, when the LLC borrows money from a bank or other third party, this increases
the LLC members’ basis in their membership interests.84 This seems an odd result. The
rule makes sense in a general partnership; the partner becomes personally liable on the
loan, so the loan is treated as an additional investment by the partner.85 The same
rationale is not available when owners are not personally liable on the loan; nevertheless,
the same partnership rule applies to the LLC.86
If an LLC member withdraws and is paid for his or her membership interest
through a distribution of appreciated property, rather than in cash, no tax is imposed.87
Any gain the LLC member has realized on his or her membership interest is ultimately
taxed when the property received is resold.88 In an S corporation, if a shareholder’s stock
is repurchased by the corporation in exchange for appreciated property, not only may the
shareholder be taxed on the gain realized on the sale of his or her stock,89 but the
83
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corporation recognizes gain just as if it had sold the appreciated property and paid the
shareholder cash. That gain is then passed through to all shareholders.90
Where a member in an LLC dies, sometimes heirs taking the LLC interest may be
better off than if they had inherited stock in an S corporation. If the LLC has property
whose fair value is higher than its depreciated value for tax purposes, the heirs may be
able to adjust the basis attributable to them so that they can get more depreciation
deductions on their taxes in the future. In an S corporation, only the basis of the stock
would be affected; this would give the heir tax benefits only if the heir later sold the
stock. It would not result in greater depreciation deductions if the heir continued to hold
the stock.91
Despite these advantages, there are also some significant disadvantages to the
LLC. The first is a problem for minority owners in both LLCs and S corporations. Many
small businesses need to reinvest all of their profits in the business for a number of years.
That fact does not prevent the investor from being taxed on his or her share the earnings
of the LLC or S corporation. The investor must have a source of funds to pay those
taxes. Minority investors may find themselves in a cash bind if they have not negotiated
provisions obligating the business to distribute sufficient funds to enable them to pay the
income taxes imposed on them.
Some small businesses are formed with the hope that if they are successful, they
will be acquired in the future by a large publicly held company. When that kind of
acquisition is made, it is usually desirable to structure it as a tax-free reorganization as
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defined in Section 368 of the Internal Revenue Code. A merger or acquisition of an LLC
by a corporation does not qualify for tax-free reorganization treatment.92 Therefore, an
LLC about to be acquired may need to convert to corporate form. Sometimes companies
that anticipate being acquired in the future by larger businesses are formed initially as
corporations rather than LLCs in order to avoid the expense and delay of conversion later
on.
Another potential disadvantage of the LLC involves not federal income tax, but
federal social security (FICA) and self-employment taxes, including Medicare taxes. An
employee and employer each pay half of the employee’s required FICA taxes; a selfemployed individual, including a partner or LLC member, pays the entire amount
personally as self-employment tax. In 2004, the self-employment tax and combined
social security tax rate was 15.3% on earnings up to $87,900, and 2.9% on all earnings
above that.93
In the S corporation, the amount that a shareholder receives as a salary for
working as a manager or officer in the business, and which is therefore subject to social
security tax, is usually clear. The earnings that are a return on investment as a
shareholder, and not for working as an officer or employee, are not subject to those taxes.
In an LLC, the line between employment income and amounts received as a return on
investment is less clear. The Internal Revenue Code, in its typically convoluted manner,
focuses on whether the LLC member is in essence a limited partner. Amounts received
for working in the business are subject to self-employment tax. Amounts received for the
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kind of passive investment that a limited partner makes are not. 94 In 1997, the IRS
proposed a controversial set of regulations that would have helped LLC investors
determine more clearly their self-employment tax liability.95 Those regulations have
never been adopted in final form, so that investors in an LLC walk on somewhat
uncertain ground in determining the extent of their liability for self-employment tax.
All of this, finally, suggests another disadvantage of the LLC—the complexity of
partnership tax rules when compared to tax rules governing corporations.
2. Business Advantages
Even if LLCs provided no tax advantages over corporations, they would still be
extremely attractive for small businesses because of the informality and flexibility which
they offer. In the typical small business, the owners seek legal advice in starting the
business. Once they receive a fancy binder containing the business’ organizational
documents, their concern about legal formalities often disappears. The binder is placed
in a file cabinet or desk drawer, and the owners move on to the real work of operating the
business day to day. If the business was formed as a corporation, the lawyer reminds the
owners that they need to make major decisions at board of directors meetings at which
minutes are taken. The principals are instructed that each year they should hold a
shareholders meeting and elect themselves directors again for the following year.96
For the business that is owned and managed by two or three individuals who work
together day-to-day in the business, these formalities seem useless, if not absurd. It is
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unlikely that they will remember that their discussion about changing suppliers might in
fact be a directors’ meeting. Unless the lawyer calls them each year, they almost
certainly will forget to hold a formal shareholders meeting—after all they meet together
every day at work. Even for a small business with one or two passive investors, these
formalities are probably generally ignored.
It is possible to obtain most of the informalities offered by an LLC in a closely
held corporation through properly drafted close corporation agreements.97 However, in
the LLC the informal operational provisions are the default rules and need not be
specially drafted.
In a number of states, LLCs also offer investors greater flexibility in financing of
the business. Some state corporate statutes prohibit, or at least limit, the extent to which
the corporation may issue stock in exchange for future services or promissory notes.98
LLC statutes universally impose no such limits. The promoter may take membership
interests in the LLC in exchange for a promise to pay in the future or his or her agreement
to operate the business, limited only by broad fiduciary duties and not by technical limits
on the kind of consideration that can be used.99
The flexibility of LLCs also is the source of one of their disadvantages. LLC
statutes are sometimes not comprehensive in creating default rules. More often than in
corporate statutes, they fail to anticipate some of the gaps that may occur in poorly
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drafted governing documents.100 The absence of some needed default rules means that
lawyers must draft operating agreements more carefully than they draft corporate bylaws. If the lawyer has failed to provide for a particular contingency, there is less
likelihood that LLC statutes will provide an adequate default rule to fill the gap.
III.
Explaining the Non-Adopting States
The data set out in Part I of this article indicates a wide disparity in the use of
LLCs between states. In particular, in six states corporations still outnumber LLCs by at
least 2-to-1. While discerning motivations of lawyers and their clients is a difficult task,
there are special features in most of these states which tend to make the initial formation
costs or ongoing operating costs of LLCs higher than for corporations.
New York
New York imposes an elaborate and costly publication requirement on LLCs that
it does not impose on corporations. The LLC must publish a notice of its formation, with
specified information in it, once per week for six weeks in two newspapers, approved by
the county clerk in the county of its home office. At least one of the papers must be in
the city or town where its office will be located.101 Particularly for businesses
headquartered in the largest metropolitan areas, this publication requirement can add
significant costs to starting up a business. A similar requirement applies to foreign LLCs
applying for a certificate of authority to do business in New York.102
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In addition, New York’s tax law imposes an annual filing fee on LLCs that is not
imposed on corporations. The fee is imposed on any LLC that has income from New
York sources. Before 2003, the fee was $50 per member, with a minimum of $325 and a
maximum of $10,000. It did not apply to single-member LLCs. In 2003, a temporary
increase in this fee for 2003 and 2004 was enacted. It rose to $100 per member with a
minimum of $500 and a maximum of $25,000. Also a filing fee of $100 was imposed on
single-member LLCs.103
California
California imposes a hefty annual franchise fee of $800 on every LLC, just as it
does on corporations. But in addition, any LLC with income of over $250,000 per year
must pay an annual statutory fee beginning at $900 and escalating to as much as $11,700
for an LLC with total annual income of $5 million or more. 104
Florida
The comparatively few LLCs in Florida likely has a rather different explanation.
Florida had a slow start. Even though Florida was the second state in the nation to enact
an LLC statute, until 1998 there were significant state tax impediments to using an LLC.
Until that year, Florida imposed its 5.5% corporate income tax on both LLCs and S
corporations.105 In addition, other aspects of Florida’s LLC statute were unattractive. As
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one Florida author has stated: “Although Florida was the second state to adopt an LLC
statute …, that statute was the business form version of an Edsel. Nobody bought it.”106
The slow-start theory is supported by a comparison of 2003 data with that of
2002. While in both years corporations outnumbered LLCs by over 2:1, the growth rate
of LLCs from 2002 to 2003 was vastly greater than the growth rate for corporations. The
number of corporations increased only 18%; the number of LLCs grew by 61.5%.107
Illinois
Illinois charges $500 to file articles of organization for an LLC, while the fee for
articles of incorporation is only $150. LLCs must file an annual report each year and pay
a fee of $250. The comparable fee for corporations is only $75.108 While these
differentials are significant, one wonders whether they are large enough to account for the
large disparity in the number of LLCs that are used in comparison to corporations.
Another explanation suggested on the web site of one CPA in Illinois is that Illinois
lawyers charge significantly higher fees to create LLCs than they do for corporations.109
North Dakota
Like the other states in which LLCs have not become dominant, North Dakota
law reflects a significant differential in fees. The fee for filing articles of incorporation is
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$30; the fee for filing LLC articles of organization is $125. The fee for filing a
corporation’s annual report is $25; for an LLC it is $50.110
There is also significant question about the accuracy of the 2003 data reported by
North Dakota. In 2002, the reported total of all corporate and LLC filings in North
Dakota was 3,239. For 2003, North Dakota reported a total of 29,274 filings, a nine-fold
increase and more filings than neighboring Minnesota whose population is over seven
times that of North Dakota’s.111 However, even the probably-more-accurate 2002 data
indicated that over twice as many corporation as LLC filings were being made in the
state.
South Dakota
South Dakota shows only minor fee differentials. Initial filing fees are essentially
the same. For a corporation, annual report fees are $30. For an LLC, the fee is $50.112
A more likely explanation is that the data reported for South Dakota for 2003 are
inaccurate. Taken from the IACA 2004 Annual Report of Jurisdictions, there are
significant discrepancies between this data and that reported previously in the IACA 2003
Report. 2002 data reported in the 2003 Report indicated that slightly over 35% of filings
were for LLCs-- 2,395 corporate filings and 1,300 LLC filings. In the 2004 IACA
Report, the 2002 data that should have been the same as that reported the year before
instead showed a total of 29,674 business filings instead of the 3,695 filings previously
reported. It then reported 2003 filings that totaled 31,309. This number seems
110
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implausible; it exceeds the number of filings for neighboring Minnesota that has over six
times as many people as South Dakota.113 A search of Public Records for South Dakota
on LEXIS reveals more plausible figures: 2,862 corporations and 1,656 LLCs, with LLCs
comprising 36.65% of total filings.
How Much Do Fee Differentials Matter?
While it is possible to point to fee differentials in the states in which LLCs have
been least used, whether such differentials are sufficiently important to deter use of LLCs
remains an open question. Some states in which LLCs have been most widely accepted
have at least minor fee differentials. Wisconsin, for example, charges $170 to file LLC
articles in paper and $130 to file them electronically. The fee for filing corporate articles
is $100.114 However, this differential seems modest in relation to those in most of the
non-adopting states.
Many LLCs are extremely small businesses with limited capital. A few hundred
dollars at the time of formation plus a few hundred dollars differential each year may be
sufficient to affect the choice of entity. For many, perhaps an S corporation will seem
“good enough”, given this price differential.
IV.
Why Is Legal Education Mired In the Past In Teaching Business Organizations?
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While the teaching of law from casebooks has several interrelated
justifications,115 fifty years ago Columbia Law Professor Edwin W. Patterson described
one of them in this way:
Reported cases are frequently good evidence of contemporary American culture,
of the way people do business normally …, of family arrangements, of police
practices, etc. 116
In furnishing students evidence of the dominance of LLCs in contemporary small
business practice in America, the leading casebooks can only be counted as failures.
If we were designing materials to reflect that which students will actually
encounter in law practice they would be significantly different from today’s leading
casebooks. If we were a law school curriculum committee, course offerings would look
very different from those that prevail at American law schools. Advising a client about to
embark upon a new small business, the lawyer will typically offer the client two
choices—incorporate or form a limited liability company.
What of general partnerships? Today and in the future, new general partnerships
will never be lawyered arrangements. They will be the inadvertent result of individuals
entering business together informally. The Uniform Partnership Act default rules will
then take hold of these informal arrangements, not because the entrepreneurs intelligently
chose them, but because the law creates an ultimate set of default rules for those who
leave their fate to chance.
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What of limited partnerships? They are still used occasionally. For example, in
2003, California reported 5,560 new domestic and foreign limited partnerships; Delaware
reported 5,572; New York reported 1,357.117 The drafters of the 2001 Uniform Limited
Partnership Act identified the situations in which limited partnerships are most likely to
be used in a world dominated by LLCs: “(i) sophisticated, manager-entrenched
commercial deals whose participants commit for the long term, and (ii) estate planning
arrangements (family limited partnerships).”118
Finally, what about limited liability partnerships (LLPs)? In states like New York
which have “full shield” LLP statutes that protect against contract as well as tort liability,
LLPs are used by law firms. The main advantage is that there need not be a total
redrafting of organizational documents. The original partnership agreement—no doubt
worked out through painful negotiations many years ago—can be retained. A vote of
partners and an LLP filing is all that is needed.119 Converting to an LLC with the
attendant redrafting of basic documents would invite partners to raise difficult issues (like
relative shares of profits) that most partners would rather leave lying where they are. So
in New York in 2003—a state that has not widely adopted LLCs—480 new domestic and
foreign LLPs filed. This number is, of course, miniscule in comparison to the 40,768
LLC filings.120
To these developments, we should add one more. Increasingly, a different set of
governance rules are developing for publicly held corporations as opposed to small
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businesses, whatever their legal form. The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002121 removed any doubt about the emergence of two sets of rules—one for public
companies and another for closely held ones. This statute created an elaborate set of new
requirements, administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which apply
only to companies that are publicly held or which are in the process of going public.122
How would the above reality be reflected in a law school curriculum and in law
school casebooks that were truly designed to be good evidence of the way people
normally do business in contemporary America? A law school might offer a course in
Small Business Organizations in which equal time was spent covering LLCs and
corporations. The LLC coverage would be preceded by a brief overview of agency and
partnership law, with an emphasis on their applicability to unlawyered small business
arrangements. However, most of the principles of partnership law would be taught as
part of the coverage of LLCs. A separate course might then examine the special issues
related to Publicly Held Corporations. Alternatively, separate courses, one in
Corporations and another in Limited Liability Companies might be offered, with the
latter including brief coverage of the applicability of partnership and agency law to
informal business arrangements.
The wide disparity in LLC statutes, of course, makes teaching of LLCs in law
schools more difficult. Which statute should a teacher use in a course? Standard
statutory compilations published for law schools have chosen to include the Uniform
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Limited Liability Company Act and Delaware’s statute.123 Those are reasonable choices
since they represent two ends of the spectrum of statutes. The Uniform Act draws
heavily on partnership law. Delaware’s law draws more heavily on the corporate statute
for inspiration.
There is little current empirical information on the business curriculum in
American law schools. The existing studies are six to seven years old. Those studies
suggest that law schools remain in denial so far as the LLC revolution is concerned. In
May 1998, Prof. Robert Thompson obtained information from 71 teachers in 62 law
schools about the coverage of their Business Associations courses. Almost all of the
courses were 3 or 4 credit hours, i.e. 45 to 65 class hours over a semester. The average
time devoted to partnerships was 4.18 hours. For closely held corporations, average
coverage was 3.23 hours. The average time devoted to limited liability businesses of all
kinds was 1.20 hours.124
If LLCs were not being covered in any significant way in the basic Business
Associations course, were they being covered in a separate course? In the same study, 22
schools reported advanced courses in Agency and Partnership, while only 8 reported
separate courses in Closely Held Businesses and 2 reported separate courses in Limited
Liability Entities.125 These numbers are reinforced by a survey conducted two years
earlier obtaining information from 83 schools on new courses and seminars that had been
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added to the curriculum between 1994 and 1997. While these schools together added 174
courses and seminars in the business and commercial area, only 4 were on limited
liability companies.126
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the situation in law schools has changed little
since these studies were conducted. The Association of American Law Schools sponsors
numerous Sections which are interest groups made up of faculty from law schools around
the country. For many years, it has had a Business Associations Section. In 2002, a new
Section was created: “Agency, Partnership, LLCs and Unincorporated Associations”.127
LLCs are there, among the list of many non-corporate forms. They are not recognized as
sufficiently different from general partnerships, limited partnerships, LLPs and the like to
deserve a separate Section devoted to them. They are not recognized as the dominant
business form in the real world of business entities.
If courses covering LLCs were being offered in any appreciable numbers, law
publishers who keep in close contact with law faculty, would likely have produced new
casebooks. Instead, as the following review of recent casebooks indicates, LLCs
continue to be treated as one of the several interesting permutations growing out of
partnership law. Limited liability companies are not treated as one of the two dominant
small business forms in 21st century America.
A Review of the Casebooks
Law students’ understanding of the world in which they will practice is shaped
largely by the experience of their law teachers and the material in the casebooks they
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read. The dominant pattern in hiring in American law schools makes it unlikely that most
teachers of Business Associations have had significant recent experience in representing
small businesses.128 So the content of casebooks is often critical in shaping both
teachers’ and students’ understanding of the business realities to which legal doctrines
will apply. LLCs are slighted in the standard Business Associations and Corporations
casebooks of the three leading publishers of law school teaching materials. Given the
rapid rise of LLCs, I have limited this survey to casebooks with a copyright date of 2003
or 2004. It would be unfair to expect earlier casebooks to fully reflect the revolution.
However, even these recently published casebooks have largely remained in denial about
the most important change in small business practice in decades.
One significant indicator of the emphasis placed on various business forms in
contemporary casebooks is the number of pages devoted to each business form. Another
is the manner in which the development of LLCs is described in the casebook.

Klein, Ramseyer & Bainbridge
The 2003 Fifth Edition of Klein, Ramseyer & Bainbridge’s casebook is titled
Business Associations: Cases and Materials on Agency, Partnerships and Corporations.
LLCs are not included in the title. It turns out, however, that there is an entire chapter
devoted to them, plus a separate section on LLC mergers and a case on LLC interests as
securities—all told, 47 pages in an 898 page casebook. The rest of the book covers other
business forms: 91 pages are devoted to Agency; 104 pages are devoted to general
partnerships; 12 pages at various points in the book are devoted to limited partnerships;
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the rest of the book focuses on corporations. More importantly, the chapter on LLCs
gives no hint of the growing importance of this business form. The one page introduction
to three principal LLC cases and a Problem based on a fourth case informs the reader:
The Limited Liability Company (LLC) is an alternative form of business
organization that combines certain features of the corporate form with others
more closely resembling general partnerships. ***
The formation of an LLC, like the formation of a corporation, requires
some paperwork and filings with a state agency. Some states impose fees and
taxes (generally modest) on LLCs that are not imposed on partnerships.
Another recent development is the Limited Liability Partnership
(LLP).***129
It is only in the last paragraph of the introduction discussing LLPs that any mention is
made of the extent to which the new non-corporate business forms have in fact been
adopted in the business and legal world. The authors quote a 1995 article by Prof. Robert
Hamilton stating that more than 1,200 law firms in Texas, virtually all the state’s largest
ones, became LLPs within one year after the LLP legislation was enacted.130
Hynes and Lowenstein
The 2003 Sixth Edition of Hynes and Lowenstein’s casebook, Agency,
Partnership, and the LLC: The Law of Unincorporated Business Enterprises, devotes
more pages to LLCs than does any other standard casebook. While over half of the book
is devoted to agency law, the last chapter, 71 pages in the 900 page book, focuses on
129
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Limited Liability Companies. In comparison, 260 pages are devoted to general
partnerships (including LLPs) and 65 pages (almost as many as in the LLC chapter) are
devoted to limited partnerships.
An introductory note to LLCs, slightly over two pages in length, is the book’s sole
attempt to explain the current importance of this business form. The following excerpts
from suggest its flavor—one that does somewhat more than other books to alert students
to the contemporary importance of LLCs:
The limited liability company (“LLC”) is a relatively new form of doing
business.***
The LLC is viewed by some investors as an improvement over the limited
partnership because it allows for the exercise of managerial powers without the
risk of personal liability for the debts of the business….***
The LLC is viewed as an improvement of the general partnership because
there is no personal liability for the debts of the business.***
The LLC is an improvement over the corporation in some situations
because it can be run more informally and the double taxation of operating in
corporate form is avoided. It is regarded as an improvement over the Subchapter
S corporation because its organization and operation are far less restricted.
These advantages created a powerful incentive for states to pass enabling
legislation allowing people to adopt this form of doing business once the Internal
Revenue Service approved partnership tax status for a properly formed LLC.***
The interest in the LLC is such that the field already has generated several
substantial treatises and form books.***
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Almost all of the LLC enabling legislation was passed in the states only a
few years ago. Thus the LLC is so new on the legal horizon that there is limited
case authority available on it.***131
Hamilton and Macey
Hamilton and Macey’s Eighth Edition of Cases and Materials on Corporations
Including Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, published in 2003, includes a
27 pages on Limited Liability Companies. Well over 1000 pages of the 1276-page
casebook are devoted to corporations. General partnerships get almost five times the
number of pages that LLCs do. Partnership cases and notes span 131 pages—including
seven pages devoted to limited liability partnerships. Limited partnerships capture
virtually the same space as do LLCs-- 26 pages.
In an introductory chapter devoted to all the various business forms, the editors
describe the LLC a “a truly new business form” and tell their readers that “use of the
LLC form has increased exponentially during the 1990s.”132 However, in a lengthy
introduction in the chapter devoted to LLCs, the editors conclude:
Despite numerous predictions that LLCs will quickly become the predominant
business form for closely held businesses, data on the number of LLC formations
indicate that growth has not been overwhelming.133
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Supporting this statement, the editors cite Prof. John Lee’s 2000 article134 which, as
discussed earlier, had analyzed data for 1995-1998, not the more recent data that leads to
an exactly contrary conclusion.135
Choper, Coffe and Gilson
The 2004 Sixth Edition of Choper, Coffee & Gilson’s Cases and Materials on
Corporations is an 1188 page book that is overwhelmingly devoted to corporations.
However, in a chapter on “Business Organization for the Smaller Enterprise”, along with
an 83-page discussion of close corporations the authors devote 12 pages to LLCs, 11
pages to limited partnerships, and just over one page to LLPs.136 In a two-paragraph
introduction to LLCs, the authors state that the LLC “has proved to be enormously
successful”.137 However, a three-paragraph concluding note to the LLC section is
captioned in bold type, “Why Are LLCs Not More Popular?”.138 The major citation to
substantiate the assertion that LLCs have not supplanted other business forms is a 2001
law review article which used data for 1993 to1999, and focused mainly on whether
LLCs had become more popular than LLPs.139
Ribstein and Letsou
Ribstein and Letsou’s Business Associations, Fourth Edition, published in 2003.
gives some of the briefest treatment to LLCs. Most of the 1004 page casebook is devoted
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to corporations. Partnerships get approximately 52 pages. Limited partnerships get 10
pages. LLPs get 4 pages. LLCs get only seven!
In introducing LLCs, the authors say: “Over a half million LLCs filed returns in
the 1999 tax year—significantly more than the number of limited partnerships, and over
30% of the total number of tax partnerships.”140
Smith and Williams
A new Business Organizations casebook appeared in 2004—Smith and Williams,
Business Organizations, Cases, Problems, and Case Studies. In their Preface, the authors
discuss the movement in law schools from two separate courses--one in Corporations and
another in Agency and Partnership—to a single course in Business Associations. They
then comment:
The most significant challenge … is that the law relating to business associations
has been expanding at an unprecedented rate. Over the past two decades, new
business associations (such as limited liability companies, limited liability
partnerships, and variations of the business trust) have been developed and have
gained widespread acceptance in the business world.141
Despite this insight, the book allocates only 23 of its 840 pages to LLCs. General
partnerships get 74 pages; LLPs get 10; Limited Partnerships get 9. In introducing LLCs,
the authors accurately inform readers: “The most important development in recent years
in the area of business associations is the widespread acceptance of limited liability
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companies (LLCs) as an alternative entity for small businesses.”142 Despite this, the book
gives 29 times the amount of space (669 pages) to Corporations as to LLCs.
Hazen and Markham
Limited liability Companies get 13 pages in Hazen and Markham’s 1,277 page
casebook, Corporations and Other Business Enterprises Cases and Materials, published
in 2003. General partnerships get 25 pages; Limited Partnerships get 12; LLPs get 3
pages. Again the lion’s share of coverage goes to Corporations. This casebook gives
little hint of the contemporary importance of LLCs. In a Note following one of the cases,
the authors merely remark: “Federal income tax advantages spurred the spread of LLC
statutes.”143
Allen and Kraakman
Allen and Kraakman’s 2004 book, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of
Business Organizations devotes only three of the book’s 654 pages to LLCs. Despite its
2003 publication date, the book relies on 1996 and 1997 data to conclude that “recent
trends suggest the benefits of LLCs are gaining widespread acceptance (even as
corporations remain the dominant form of legal entity)”.144 The editors stress that the
LLC has largely replaced the limited partnership in oil and gas ventures, real estate
investment and active investment companies.145 Nevertheless, limited partnerships also
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get 3 pages. General partnerships command 33 pages. In this generally pared-down
book, Corporations are covered in 573 pages.
Bauman Weiss and Palmiter
Bauman, Weiss and Palmiter’s 2003 casebook, Corporations Law and Policy
Materials and Problems, Fifth Edition primarily covers Corporations. However,
scattered throughout a 17 page discussion of choice of organizational form is information
on LLCs along with other business forms. After briefly describing the advantages of an
LLC, the authors comment: “This has led some commentators to speculate that the advent
of the LLC may spell the death knell of the general partnership form of business
organization.”146 They make no predictions about the impact of LLCs on corporations.
Interpreting the Results
What are we to make of this departure from business world realities reflected in
Business Organization casebooks? There are a number of possible explanations—but
none are particularly satisfactory.
Given the comments in a number of the books, many of the authors seem to have
been unaware of the full extent to which by 2002 LLCs had intruded on the landscape.
The formal data showing the sea change in LLC adoptions was not fully available, and
certainly had not been commented upon in the academic literature, at the time these
casebooks were being prepared. The trend was obvious to many practicing lawyers, even
without the formal data. However, many of the authors of the leading Business
Associations casebooks live in states in which LLCs have been the least popular. Of the
21 authors of the casebooks reviewed, twelve of them teach at law schools in California,
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New York, Massachusetts, Illinois and Texas—all states in which 40% or fewer of new
businesses are LLCs.147 It is likely that these authors do not normally interact with
practicing lawyers who prefer LLCs as a business form.
The market for Business Organizations casebooks is also largest in states in which
LLCs have been least popular. Law schools in California, Florida, New York, Illinois,
Massachusetts, and Texas enroll very large numbers of students. California alone boasts
52 different law schools, and New York has 15.148
There are other reasons as well that probably contribute to the skimpy coverage of
LLCs in these standard Business Organization casebooks. Many of these casebooks are
in their third, fourth, fifth, or even eighth, editions. To turn an existing casebook into a
model that reflects the reality of today’s business world would involve far more rewriting
and restructuring than is normal for merely a new edition. Indeed it would involve
creating an entirely different book. Three constituencies are resistant to this kind of
wholesale restructuring—the authors, law school faculty who currently teach from the
book, and publishers. For authors, the amount of work involved is immense. For current
users of the casebook, a new edition that departs radically from the old means that
entirely new class notes must be prepared. One might consider switching to a totally
different book at that point. For publishers, the possibility of losing current users by
substituting an unknown new product for a profitable and well-accepted existing one
creates an unattractive business risk.
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Yet among the casebooks surveyed above are three that appeared in their premier
editions in 2003 or 2004. Why are they not better reflections of the real world? With a
plethora of books devoted primarily to corporations, why is at least one of the new titles
not a book devoted to LLCs? First, to the extent that an author proposes a casebook
designed for a separate course in LLCs, publishers respond by pointing out that few, if
any, such courses exist, so there will be no market for the book. There is, of course, a
“Catch 22” element to this. Law school faculty who may be considering offering a
separate LLC course are often deterred because no good teaching materials are available
for such a course.
From the publisher’s perspective, little is broken, so no fix is needed. The only
persons being injured by the lack of casebooks that reflect the real world are law
students—and they will not realize this until they graduate and enter law practice. Then
this lack will just be one more reason to complain about the “theory” taught in law school
that fails to prepare graduates for the actual practice of law.149 Most lawyers relish the
opportunity to take these kinds of jabs at professors who formerly held such power over
them anyway.
Casebook publishing has become increasingly concentrated in recent years. All
but one of the formerly smaller independent publishers have been acquired by the “big
three”: Thompson/West, Aspen Publishers or Lexis-Nexis. The one remaining small
independent casebook publisher is Carolina Academic Press. Publishers are driven by
the potential sales for a new casebook. Each of the publishers already has a full stable of
established titles in Business Associations. A new title is as likely to eat into its
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publishers other offerings as it is to challenge a competitor’s titles. New titles in a
crowded field are probably most welcome by publishers when they involve co-authors
each of whom can offer large classes as a guaranteed market.
We cannot, however, blame only the publishers. Few authors seem to have
seriously considered giving extensive treatment to LLCs. There appear to be two
rationalizations for this.
First, they argue that there is not yet enough case law on LLCs to assemble a
casebook on them.150 However this is demonstrably false. Cases on LLCs have begun
appearing regularly. Yet academics apparently remain unaware of many of them. One
reason for this is, again, the complicity of law publishers. The West Digest system mixes
LLC cases indiscriminately in with Corporations cases in its widely-used Key Number
System. This hides the true growth of case law in this area. In 2004, West began to take
steps to remedy this. West has included a new special Key Number (241E) for LLCs in
its electronic Key Cite system in Westlaw. However, this new category is not yet
reflected in the paper version of its digests, and as of July 2004 only a handful of cases
have been transferred online to the new key number.
There are, however, other ways to discover new LLC cases. Full text searches in
LEXIS and Westlaw turn them up. Admittedly, there are not as many cases as in the
corporate area, but there are significant numbers of LLC cases. Modern casebooks in
Business Associations set out comparatively few principal cases. Certainly the available
cases, along with problems and notes, give sufficient material to produce a useful
casebook.
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When faced with the facts that the raw material is there, authors often resort to
another explanation. Since LLCs are a cross between partnerships and corporations,
students can easily understand LLCs on their own once they learn partnership and
corporate law. There is no need to explicitly cover LLCs in a Business Associations
course. Again, there seems little of substance to this argument. At a time when
partnership courses were centered on the bare bones 1914 Uniform Partnership Act, one
might argue that a partnership course of necessity would deal in broad principles of
common business ownership that could easily be transferred between business forms.
However today when the majority of states have adopted the complex and technical 1997
Uniform Partnership Act, partnership law courses are likely to be more narrowly focused
if they are to be useful. The transferability of this type of partnership material to the
creation and operation of LLCs will be less obvious.
If teachers can rely on students to understand the transferability of learning to
related business forms, a different argument would seem more persuasive. Given the
relative use of the various business forms in today’s business practice, it would be more
logical to argue that at least half of the basic Business Associations course should be
devoted to LLCs, and students can easily extrapolate from this the principles needed to
deal with the residual group of partnerships that end up being formed by default.
There is yet one additional factor driving the over-emphasis on partnership law
and the ignoring of LLCs in basic Business Associations courses. This is the Bar Exam.
Most faculty protest loudly when it is suggested that their course coverage should
encompass the items on which bar examiners will test students. Yet, for the most part,
law schools do envision one of the purposes of a basic core curriculum as being
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preparation of their graduates to pass a bar exam. Bar examiners do not appear to have
changed the focus of their testing to give appropriate emphasis to limited liability
companies.
The empirical data on material actually tested on recent bar exams is difficult to
come by. Business Associations is not tested on the multiple choice Multi- State Bar
Exam, used as a portion of the state bar exam by 48 states and the District of Columbia.
Business Organizations topics are part of the Multistate Essay Exam (MEE) which is
used by 14 states and the District of Columbia along with the MBE.151 Other states write
their own Business Organizations questions. The best sources of information on bar
examiners’ outlooks are the Outlines of subjects to be covered on the bar which most
states issue.
The MEE outline of topics potentially covered on the bar exam embraces the
importance of LLCs. The outline gives equal coverage to corporations and LLCs.
However, when we shift focus to the essay portion of bar exams in other states, quite a
different picture appears. On the theory that LLCs would most likely be covered on the
bar exam in states in which LLCs are most widely used, I reviewed the rules covering bar
exam subjects in the 11 states which in 2003 reported that LLC filings constituted over
60% of their business filings. In only one of those states, New Hampshire, were LLCs
given equal billing with agency, partnerships and corporations.152 Some of the other
states indicate that they test on “business organizations” or “business entities”, but do not
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specifically mention LLCs. A number of those states specifically mention agency,
partnerships and corporations as areas of coverage, along with the general reference to
business organizations.153
Delaware, Michigan, Missouri and New Jersey do not even leave open the option
of testing on LLCs. They specify agency, partnerships and corporations as topics
covered, but do not even include a general reference to other business forms.154
Wisconsin admits graduates of in-state law schools without an exam through its diploma
privilege. To qualify, students must take at least 60 semester hours from a list of
electives. These same subjects are tested in the bar exam for applicants who do not
qualify for the diploma privilege. The list includes courses in partnerships and
corporations, but makes no reference to LLCs.155
If states in which LLCs have become popular seldom include LLCs on their bar
exams, we would expect no greater coverage in states in which LLCs are not as widely
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used. A sampling of bar exam coverage in those states confirms that conclusion. New
York tests on “Business Relationships”, without further specification.156 California tests
on “Corporations”, but not on LLCs.157
V.
The Need for Scholarly Analysis and Law Reform: The Social Costs of Academic
Neglect
As we have seen, for the most part LLC statutes were drafted quickly by small
groups of practitioners in each state. They may have had the ABA Prototype Limited
Liability Company Act and statutes from other states to use as models. But often states
seem to have borrowed heavily from their own partnership and corporate statutes in their
drafting of LLC laws. This hurried and competitive drafting has resulted in a wide
disparity between statutes. Indeed it was this “dazzling array of diversity” that led to the
drafting of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act.158 However only eight states
have adopted the ULLCA.159
Existing LLC statutes are far from perfect. In all areas of law, statutory
provisions undergo continual scrutiny and updating. In “technical” areas, like the law of
business organizations, state legislatures often rely on outside experts to initiate law
reform. The diversity in LLC statutes makes law reform more difficult. Unlike the
156
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corporate area, where reform is typically initiated by Delaware or by the drafters of the
Model Business Corporation Act160, in the LLC area no recognized lead group has
emerged to spearhead technical law reform. It is voids such as this that cry out for the
work of academic researchers. As we have seen, however, academics have often ignored
the LLC.
Because of the wide variations in provisions of different LLC statutes, there is
often a need for state-specific reforms in the law. Even though it should be, this task is
not well suited to the typical research agenda of today’s law school faculty members.
Law schools strive for national recognition;161 state-specific research suggests that one’s
law school is merely a local lawyer-training facility. That is inconsistent with attempting
to move up in the “pecking order” of law schools. It is also inconsistent with law
schools’ decades-old efforts to prove that they are part of a university engaged in broadbased research, and are not merely a “trade school”.162 Another impediment to law
reform suggestions by academics is the fact that it is more difficult for faculty to find
publication outlets for state-specific research. Generally only law reviews published by
schools in the state involved are willing to consider articles relating to a single state’s
law. In many cases this limits a faculty member to a handful of journals, all of whom
have third year law students, rather than peer reviewers, making decisions on which
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articles to publish.163 Sometimes it effectively limits a faculty author to publishing in his
or her own school’s law review, and that is often looked down upon by tenure and
promotion committees.
If the world were different and academics could focus on research to improve the
nearly dominant business form in use for small businesses, what would their research
agendas look like? Many state statutes display significant weaknesses in rather basic
areas. Practitioner-drafters, apparently focusing on the needs of their universe of clients,
sometimes failed to foresee the wider group of businesses that would ultimately choose
the LLC form. Some of the drafters, coming from a corporate practice, inserted detailed
provisions from corporate statutes relating to matters of less concern to LLCs,164 while
ignoring fundamental issues that small businesses adopting the LLC form might often
encounter. Some drafters, including those drafting the Uniform Act, analogized LLCs
too closely to partnerships, failing to foresee some of the subtle differences between the
two forms.
At least four areas would suggest themselves as candidates for an initial attempt at
law reform.
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A. Conceptualizing the Operating Agreement
For an LLC, the operating agreement is the key document that governs relations
between members of the LLC.165 The operating agreement resembles the partnership
agreement in a general partnership; it also resembles corporate by-laws. Ultimately
however it is different from both of these.
In many cases, LLCs—particularly manager-managed LLCs—replace the S
corporation as the business form preferred by entrepreneurs and their lawyers. Promoters
therefore often envision the corporate model of bringing in a few outside investors. The
LLC will be formed by those who originally conceive it, its organizational documents
will be executed, and it may be that only somewhat later will a few angel investors or
venture capitalists will be sought out. For the investor purchasing corporate stock later
than the promoters do, it is clear that the corporate by-laws adopted by the promoters are
binding. No such automatic application of the operating agreement in an LLC occurs
merely because an investor acquires a membership interest in the business.
Aware of the fact that LLCs are sometimes run informally, most LLC statutes
provide that the operating agreement is any agreement of the LLC members relating to
the affairs of the LLC, whether the agreement is written or oral.166 What happens if a
written operating agreement has been prepared, an investor is listed in it as being a
member, but the investor fails to sign the operating agreement? Is it binding on the
member if all the other members have signed it? Do we need to determine whether the
165
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member has informally agreed to the document that his or her fellow-members have
actually signed? What if no one has signed the document, but all investors have
informally acquiesced to a draft of the operating agreement?167
LLC statutes would be more useful if they gave clearer guidance on how to
resolve this kind of question. They might, for example, be amended to provide that if an
individual advances funds in exchange for membership interests that are validly issued to
the investor, even if the investor has not signed the LLC’s formal operating agreement a
presumption will arise that the individual has accepted the operating agreement that has
been signed by the other members. Here is an early topic for the agenda of LLC law
reformers.
B. Basic Issues of Authority
Limited Liability Companies may be member-managed or manager-managed,
depending upon the election made in the operating agreement or articles of organization.
Generally if the organizational documents are silent on the matter, the default rule results
in the LLC being member-managed.168 A member or manager who has actual authority
to conduct the LLC’s affairs clearly binds the LLC when the individual enters a
transaction on behalf of the company. The more difficult question arises, however, when
an individual without actual authority purports to enter a transaction on behalf of the
LLC. When will the LLC be bound?
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At first blush, this appears to present a run-of-the-mill question of apparent
authority.169 However, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that the peculiar
language in various LLC statutes can make the issue of apparent authority in an LLC
significantly more complicated that the analogous question in the context of partnership
or corporate law. Many statutes have included provisions that appear to confuse the
usual concepts of actual and apparent authority. Beyond this, the special problem of
whether an LLC member can have apparent authority to act on behalf of a managermanaged LLC creates special complications not present in other business forms.
The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act has largely avoided the confusion
present in a number of other LLC statutes. Section 301 of the Uniform Act makes it clear
that if a member or manager has actual authority, the person’s act binds the LLC. If a
member or manager does not have actual authority, the person’s act does not bind the
company when a third person had notice or knowledge of the lack of authority. In
dealings with a person who does not have such notice or knowledge, an act by the
member binds the LLC if the LLC is member-managed and the member’s act is for
apparently carrying on in the ordinary course the company’s business or business of the
kind carried on by the company. If the LLC is manager-managed, a manager’s act in
dealing with a person who has no notice or knowledge of the manager’s lack of authority
binds if it is apparently for carrying on in the ordinary course the company’s business or
business of the kind carried on by the company. A member in a manager-managed LLC
does not have apparent authority solely by reason of being a member, just as a
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shareholder in a corporation lacks apparent authority to bind the corporation solely
because the individual is a shareholder.170
The special problem with this distinction in the LLC is that in some states third
parties have no way of knowing whether an LLC is or is not manager-managed. Nothing
about the name of an LLC hints at whether it is member or manager managed. In a
number of states, in order to determine this an individual must examine the LLC’s
operating agreement. However, under virtually all LLC statutes, operating agreements
are not a matter of public record. Only the brief articles of organization, not the longer
operating agreement, are filed with the state secretary of state.171 A third party can
demand a copy of the operating agreement before dealing with the LLC; however few
individuals do so in anything other than major transactions.
This problem is avoided in most states. They require that if the LLC is to be
manager managed, this must be specified in the filed articles of organization.172 In those
states, third parties are at least on constructive notice through a document that is publicly
available that they are dealing with a manager-managed LLC and that they cannot
assume that members would normally act for the company. A number of other states,
however, relegate the choice of management type to the non-public operating agreement.
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They permit, but do not require, this information to be in the articles of organization.173
Here then is another agenda item for law reformers. What are the reasonable
expectations of third parties about the power of LLC members to bind the business in
transactions on behalf of the LLC?
A few LLC statutes create another kind of confusion about authority. Concern
about the plight of those searching title when a conveyance by an LLC is in the chain of
title has led to provisions to give some comfort to property lawyers. A well-drafted
version can be found in the Uniform Act:
Unless the articles of organization limit their authority, any member of a membermanaged company or manager of a manager-managed company may sign and
deliver any instrument transferring or affecting the company’s interest in real
property. The instrument is conclusive in favor of a person who gives value
without knowledge of the lack of authority of the person signing and delivering
the instrument.174
Some states, however, have been less careful in drafting provisions to give
comfort to those searching title. They merely provide that instruments and documents
conveying or mortgaging property175 are valid and binding on the LLC if they are
executed by one or more members in a member-managed LLC or by one or more
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managers in a manager-managed company.176 Read literally, the statutes in these states
validate an unauthorized conveyance or mortgage, even where the transferee knew of the
lack of authority, so long as the proper signature appears on the relevant documents.
Prior to 2001, the Utah LLC statute contained one of these poorly drafted
provisions on transfer of property.177 In Taghipour v. Jerez178 the court was faced with
the question of whether this apparent validation of all properly-executed conveyances
trumps the provisions in the LLC statute regarding actual authority of managers. While
in this case, the third party was a bona fide purchaser and was therefore rightly protected,
the court’s rationale in upholding the mortgage of LLC property did not limit itself to the
protection of BFPs. Instead the court applied the maxim of statutory construction, “when
two statutory provisions conflict in their operation, the provision more specific in
application governs over the more general provisions.”179 That approach would call for a
literal application of the statutory language, even when the third party knew that the real
estate transaction had not been properly authorized.
Whatever the mischief of these provisions that limit themselves to conveyances
and mortgages of property, even greater confusion is created by provisions in Delaware’s
Limited Liability Company Act §18-402. The section begins by providing that an LLC
can be member-managed, in which case decisions are made by those owning a majority
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of the interests in profits. Alternatively the LLC can elect to be manager-managed in
whatever way the LLC agreement specifies. But then the section states:
Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement, each
member and manager has the authority to bind the limited liability company.
Does this mean that a member that has been outvoted by fellow members still binds the
LLC when the member enters a contract with a third party that knows of the opposition of
the majority? Does the initial phrase in the sentence mean that if the operating agreement
deprives a member or manager of actual authority to carry out a particular transaction, the
doctrine of apparent authority will not apply either to protect a third party who has been
misled? The Delaware courts do not appear to have yet interpreted this section.
Law reformers need to resurrect in LLC statutes the simple distinctions between
actual authority and apparent authority that originate in Agency law180 in order to avoid
the injustice threatened by poorly drafted provisions on the power of members and
managers to bind the LLC.
C. Fiduciary Duties
Agency, partnership and corporate law have each developed their own notion of
the duties of care and loyalty owed by those who jointly own, or who are employed in, a
business. The duties differ somewhat in each of these business forms.181 How do the
fiduciary duties of members and managers of an LLC compare with those of co-owners
or managers in other business entities?
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Let us begin with the conventional narrative. In small, closely-held businesses,
associates work together closely and their relationship requires the highest level of trust
and confidence. The strongest version of duties should prevail in the small partnershiplike business arrangement. Those duties are most often described by quoting Chief
Justice Cardozo’s New York Court of Appeals opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise
continues, the duty of finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a
workaday world for those acting at arm’s length are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then
the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is
unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
“disintegrating erosion” of particular exceptions…. Only thus has the level of
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.
It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.182
The conventional narrative continues: the small closely-held corporation is really
a partnership that happens to have filed incorporation papers with the secretary of state.
Its co-owners should be seen as partners in their relations with one another. This
equation of shareholders’ duties in the close corporation to those of partners is typified by
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s opinion in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co.:
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Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close corporation to the
partnership, the trust and confidence which are essential to this scale and manner
of enterprise, and the inherent danger to minority interests in the close
corporation, we hold that stockholders in the close corporation owe one another
substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that
partners owe to one another. In our previous decisions, we have defined the
standard of duty owed by partners to one another as the “utmost good faith and
loyalty.” 183
Justice Cardozo’s stature and eloquence have led courts to overlook the fact that
his description in Meinhard v. Salmon of rigid fiduciary duties may well not reflect the
most appropriate default standard for small business relationships. In the small business,
owners are often present on a day-to-day basis so they can directly monitor the
performance of their co-owners. This stands in sharp contrast to the publicly held
corporation in which passive and geographically dispersed shareholders must rely on
strong duties to substitute in part for their inability to actively monitor those who manage
their investment.184
Also, in the small business, an owner may have extensive dealings with the
company. For example, one owner may lease office space or other premises to the
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business or may license a patent or copyright or trademark to it.185 Elaborate restrictions
on self-dealing designed for other kinds of businesses186 may be less appropriate here. In
some situations, the small business may be so small that it does not demand the full time
attention of its manager. It might be common for the manager to be engaged other
related business activities. Applying the strict standard of the “corporate opportunity”
cases to that kind of arrangement may be inconsistent with the expectations of all the
parties involved.187
In 1997, the drafters of the Uniform Partnership Act recognized the special issues
in smaller businesses and defined more narrowly than does Meinhard v. Salmon the
fiduciary duties that partners owe to the partnership and to their co-partners.188
How should fiduciary duties in the LLC be defined? This encompasses at least
three different issues: (1) how strict a duty will be applied189; (2) to whom is the duty
owed; and (3) may the duty be modified or eliminated through provisions in the operating
agreement? As in other areas of LLC law, the LLC statutes vary widely in the extent to
which they address these questions at all, and in the answers they give when they do
address the questions.
1. Level of Duty
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The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act has adopted the same approach as
the Uniform Partnership Act as to the level of fiduciary duties.190 Members and
managers have an obligation of good faith and fair dealing.191 Beyond this, a member in
a member-managed LLC, and a manager in a manager-managed LLC have only specified
duties of loyalty; they are not subject to the open-ended kind of standard enunciated in
Meinhard v. Salmon. Their only duties of loyalty are to account for any benefit derived
from use of the company’s property or from an opportunity belonging to the company; to
refrain from dealing with the LLC as, or on behalf of, an adverse party; and to refrain
from competing with the LLC (subject to reasonable exceptions in the operating
agreement). Moreover, these duties are not violated merely because a member’s or
manager’s conduct furthers that individual’s own interest.192
As with loyalty, so with duty of care the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
follows the lead of the UPA. A member or manager is liable for breach of duty of care
only if the individual’s conduct was grossly negligent, reckless, intentional or amounted
to a knowing violation of law. LLC members bear the risk of ordinary negligence by
those they place in charge of the company. A member in a manager-managed LLC owes
no duties to the LLC or other members solely by reason of being a member.193
Many other LLC statutes are less forthcoming in providing guidance on members’
and managers’ duties of loyalty and care. The Delaware statute provides that a member
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or manager is fully protected if the individual relies in good faith on LLC records or on
information, opinions, reports and statements by other managers, members, employees
and certain professional experts.194 This, of course, suggests, that members and managers
have certain duties that can be fulfilled in part by relying on others; however the statute
does not specify the scope of those duties. While this has not prevented the courts from
finding that managers have a duty of loyalty195, the exact scope of that duty remains
unclear.
Some LLC statutes have adopted as the standard for members’ or managers’
duties the language of the state’s corporate provisions relating to directors’ obligations.
Tennessee, for example, which allows management by members or by a board of
governors (and in either event requires designation of a chief manager and a secretary)196
provides that any of those who manage the LLC must discharge their duties in good faith,
in a manner the individual reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the LLC, and
with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances.197 In the section setting out duties of members in a member-managed
LLC, the statute also requires that, except as provided in the articles or operating
agreement, every member must account to the LLC for any benefit derived from any
LLC transaction or from the use of LLC property or proprietary information.198 It does
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not, however, impose the same added requirement on governors in a board-managed
LLC. This oddity seems to be explainable by the fact that drafters borrowed partnership
law language for member-managed LLCs, but not for those that would be managed by a
board.
Corporate language, like that used in the Tennessee statute, imposes a stricter duty
of care on LLC managers and members than does the language of the Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act. In Shell v. King,199 the LLC’s chief manager delegated all
responsibility for depositing cash and preparing financial reports to the LLC’s
bookkeeper and negligently failed to ever verify whether the correct amounts were in fact
being deposited. The bookkeeper embezzled over $26,000. The manager was held liable
for breaching his duties to the LLC and its other members. Under the Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act, the manager would have been liable only if his failure to check
on the bookkeeper amounted to gross negligence.200
In contrast, Ohio adopted language from its corporate statute to define duties of
LLC managers, but is silent as to duties in a member-managed LLC. The provision on
duties of managers includes language that had been placed in the corporate statute to
protect corporate directors who defend against a hostile takeover. So a manager must act
in good faith, in a manner he believes to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
LLC and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a similar position would use
under similar circumstances. However, these duties are not violated unless it is proved
by clear and convincing evidence that the manager has not met them. Even if this
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standard is met, the manager is not liable in damages unless it is proved by clear and
convincing evidence that the improper act or omission was undertaken with deliberate
intent to injure the LLC or with reckless disregard for its best interests.201 The effect of
this provision seems to be to set the fiduciary duty of managers at a rather low level while
retaining an implicitly higher level for members in a member-managed LLC.202 This
seems backwards. The more a business has passive investors who entrust others with
managing their investment, the higher should be the duties to those investors.203
In short, drafters of LLC statutes have defined the fiduciary duties of LLC
members and managers by, seemingly randomly, borrowing language from corporate and
partnership statutes. An important piece of any law reform agenda should be an
examination of the appropriate level of fiduciary duties in an LLC and a rationalization of
fiduciary duties that apply to small businesses of various forms. Should states retain a
body of case law that imposes a high Meinhard- like duty on shareholders in a closely
held corporation without imposing the same duty on LLC members? Should the many
states which have adopted the 1997 Uniform Partnership Act204 retain a higher level of
fiduciary duty for LLC members or managers than the UPA imposes on partners?
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2. To Whom Is the Duty Owed?
An important aspect of the cases which created special duties among shareholders
of closely held corporations was their recognition that those duties are owed directly to
co-investors. This relieves shareholders in close corporations from complying with the
burdensome procedural requirements applied to derivative suits when they are
challenging the manner in which fellow shareholders operate the business.205 LLC
statutes create a great deal of uncertainty206 about whether duties are owed to the LLC
itself, or are owed instead directly to LLC members, or even to LLC managers by their
co-managers.
The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act takes the position that duties are
owed to the company and to other members and managers.207 The problematic nature of
this conclusion is illustrated by the Delaware decision in VGS, Inc. v. Castiel208 which
takes the same approach. The LLC here was to be managed by 3 managers. Two of the
three were to be appointed by Castiel, the member holding a majority interest. Castiel
appointed himself and Quinn. The third manager was to be named by Sahagen, the
minority investor in the LLC. Sahagen named himself. Castiel’s control of the LLC was
exercised in such a poor fashion that Sahagen even convinced Quinn (Castiel’s own
nominee) that Castiel needed to be ousted. This was accomplished by an elaborate
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67 (Minn. Sup. Ct., 1999) (derivative action required).
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conversion of the LLC into a corporation, carried out by the written consent of Sahagen
and Quinn. Castiel was not informed in advance of the plan, since he would have then
removed Quinn and thwarted its being carried out. Even though this procedure complied
with the literal requirements of the LLC’s operating agreement, the court invalidated it:
Sahagen and Quinn each owed a duty of loyalty to the LLC, its investors and
Castiel, their fellow manager. *** When Sahagen and Quinn, fully recognizing
that [the power to appoint and remove two of the three managers] was Castiel’s
protection against actions adverse to his majority interest, acted in secret, without
notice, they failed to discharge their duty of loyalty to him in good faith. They
owed Castiel a duty to give him prior notice even if he would have interfered with
a plan that they conscientiously believed to be in the best interest of the LLC.209
Suppose that there had been other investors in the LLC who were not represented
on the board of managers. Did Sahagen and Quinn have a duty to permit Castiel to run
the LLC into the ground just because he was the majority holder of membership
interests? What of their duty to other investors and the LLC itself? This confusion
regarding duties of members and managers again cries out for rationalization.
3. May Fiduciary Duties Be Modified or Eliminated?
Should statutory provisions specifying fiduciary duties impose mandatory
requirements on LLC members and managers, or should the members be permitted to
lessen or eliminate fiduciary duties of co-investors and managers though a provision in
the operating agreement? The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act prohibits
members from eliminating the duty of loyalty or unreasonably reducing the duty of care

209

Id. at *12 to *14.
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through the operating agreement. However the operating agreement may exempt certain
types of activities from the duty of loyalty or provide for members or disinterested
managers to waive the duty on a case by case basis.210 On the other hand, Delaware’s
statute provides that the duties of a member or manager may be expanded or restricted in
the limited liability company agreement.211 How far does this go? Does “restricting”
fiduciary duties include totally eliminating them?
A number of other state LLC statutes say nothing about the ability to use the
operating agreement to modify fiduciary duties. Nevertheless, at least one case from a
state in which the statute is silent on the matter has clearly held that an LLC operating
agreement may limit or define the scope of fiduciary duties imposed on members.212
Clarifying the extent to which fiduciary duties should be subject to contractual
modification is another aspect of LLC law that is in need of analysis. The issue has been
extensively debated in the academic literature in the context of fiduciary duties of
corporate directors.213 Do the same considerations apply to LLCs?
D. Dissolution and FLP Issues
The final item on my menu of urgent issues for study and reform by academics
relates to the default rules and statutory remedies for dissolution of LLCs. In a
partnership at will, a partner has the right to leave the partnership and force it to sell off
210

Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1995) §103(b).
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6 Del. Code §18-1101(c).

212

McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enters., 725 N.E.2d 1193, 1214 (OH Ct. App., 1999)
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See e.g. Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 Colum
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its assets, pay off creditors and distribute any surplus to the partners.214 This escape
hatch gives the holder of an otherwise illiquid investment in a small business the power
to liquidate his or her investment.215 But, in the partnership context, this power also
serves another, less commented upon, function.
A partner who withdraws from a partnership remains liable to business creditors
who pre-date the partner’s withdrawal.216 If the partner leaves the business, cedes control
to the remaining partners, but allows the business to continue, the withdrawn partner runs
the risk that the others will bankrupt the business and leave him or her with at least some
personal liability to business creditors.217 For the partner who wishes to retire without
concern about lingering personal liability, forcing the payment of all creditors in
dissolution is the primary alternative available to achieve financial peace of mind.
Membership interests in small LLCs are as illiquid as partnership interests. The
importance of an “escape hatch” for the dissatisfied investor who otherwise lacks
liquidity remains important in the LLC. However, the limited liability of LLC members
for debts of the business eliminates the other justification for permitting a withdrawing
member to trigger dissolution. The withdrawing member does not risk personal liability
to creditors even if the remaining members incompetently manage the business in the
future. At the same time, giving an investor the right to withdraw at will and have his or
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her interest repurchased by the company imposes significant costs on an LLC.218 Indeed,
one of the distinct advantages of the corporate form is the locking in of investors’
capital.219
The drafters of LLC statutes were faced with deciding whether to adopt
partnership default rules or corporate ones as to whether a member can trigger dissolution
by withdrawing. Before the IRS Check-the-Box Regulations were adopted,220
partnership default rules on dissolution helped assure that LLCs would receive
partnership tax treatment. After 1997, however, default rules that locked in capital
investments would no longer threaten the LLC’s favorable tax treatment. This led a
number of states to amend their LLC statutes after 1997 to eliminate dissolution at will as
a default rule.221 While one might imagine that eliminating dissolution at will was a
considered balancing of the advantages of an escape hatch for minorities against the costs
of forcing liquidation, in fact something else seemed to be at play in many cases.222
Again the vagaries of federal tax rules often drove the shape of LLC statutes.
LLCs are sometimes used by estate planners as a device for transferring a
business from one generation of owners to the next. When the parents’ interests are
passed to children by gift or inheritance, the value of the interests for estate and gift tax
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271, 286-90 (1986).

219

Margaret M. Blair, supra note [35]; Lynn A. Stout, supra note [35].

220

See infra ____.

221

See e.g. Calif. Corp. Code §17350; Off. Code Ga. Ann. §14-11-602; Mich. Comp. Laws §450.4801; NY
CLS Limited Liability Company Law §701(b); Ohio Rev. Code §1705.43; Wis. Stat. §183.0901.

222

For an excellent discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of adopting partnership-like default
rules for LLCs, see Sandra K. Miller, supra note [189].

74

purposes must be determined. Generally a discount is applied to the value of an interest
if it is not freely transferable or cannot be freely liquidated.223 For this reason, lawyers
often include in LLC operating agreements limitations on the ability to liquidate one’s
investment in the LLC on death or withdrawal of one or more of the LLC members, even
though there is no good business reason to include this kind of restriction.
In order to avoid the loss of tax revenues that arise from unwarranted valuation
discounts, Congress has provided that in family businesses, restrictions on the ability to
liquidate an LLC will be ignored for valuation purposes if the default rule under state law
would be less restrictive and the restriction will lapse after the business is passed on or
family members can remove the restriction once they obtain control of the LLC.224 It is
this, rather than a considered balancing of other business concerns, that led a number of
states to make certain that they do not have a default rule that permits a member to easily
cash out his or her interest in an LLC.225
The focus on estate tax planning as the driving force in shaping of dissolution
provisions in LLCs has led legislatures to ignore many of the non-tax implications of
corporate-like default rules for dissolution. As Prof. Sandra Miller suggests, perhaps
legislatures should shape the default rules of another type of unincorporated business
form to make it attractive as an estate and gift tax planning device for passing on small

223
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businesses.226 Then legislators could focus on the business needs of the more typical
small business in the state’s LLC statute.
Drafters of corporate statutes recognized that the absence of an escape hatch for
shareholders posed special problems in the closely held corporation where there was no
ready market for the company’s shares. A locked-in minority shareholder could be
subject to exploitation. The shareholder might be frozen out by the majority that
eliminates the shareholder’s employment with the company and cuts off dividends, but
continues to pay high salaries to other shareholders who still work in the business.
Traditionally, the minority shareholder was then often left with the choice of suing, or
selling out to the minority at an artificially low price.227
To create a remedy for this type of oppressive conduct, many states enacted
special corporate dissolution statutes that can be invoked by minority shareholders when
they are being treated oppressively by the majority.228 Only a few states, however,
included these kinds of dissolution provisions in their LLC statutes.229 Particularly in
states which initially had partnership-like exit provisions in their LLC statutes and then
changed to default rules that locked in investors, drafters likely overlooked the issue.
Because the elimination of dissolution at will provisions were driven by estate and gift
tax concerns, the larger issues relating to the business relationships of the parties in the
typical LLC never surfaced.
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227

See generally F. Hodge O’Neal & Robert B. Thompson, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (2d
ed., 2003).

228

See e.g. MBCA §14.30(2)(ii).

229

See e.g. Alaska Stat. §10.50.410; Cal. Corp. Code §17351; Idaho Code §53-643; 805 Ill. Compiled Stat.
Ann. §180/35-1; Minn. Stat. §322B.833. Also see Sandra K. Miller, supra note [189] at 460- 65.

76

The typical LLC statute, borrowing language from the Prototype Limited Liability
Company Act, permits court-ordered dissolution when it is no longer practicable to carry
on the LLC’s business in conformity with its operating agreement.230 Occasionally it is
clear that this statutory standard has been met.231 It is less clear however whether an
attempt by the majority to freeze out the minority owner of an LLC would make it
impracticable to carry on business in accordance with the operating agreement. The
drafters of the Prototype Act are remarkably opaque about this important question. The
Commentary to the Judicial Dissolution provision in the Prototype Act begins by stating:
The “not reasonably practicable” language probably includes at least some of
the causes of dissolution provided for in partnership law, particularly including
partner misconduct.232
That suggests that a freeze-out might trigger potential judicial dissolution.

233

But then the

Commentary goes on to describe broad provisions (like “abuse of its powers contrary to
the public policy of the state”) found in many corporate statutes234 permitting judicial
dissolution of a corporation and concludes by stating:
If an LLC could be judicially dissolved (and the members arguably subjected to
personal liability) for such indefinite concepts as the violation of public policy,
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disgruntled members and creditors would be encouraged to make this sort of
allegation in limited liability company breakups. 235
While the drafters of the Prototype Act’s judicial dissolution language may have
been wary of applying broad language in corporate statutes to LLCs, it would indeed be
an odd result if the LLC statute, which is supposed to create a hybrid business form, gives
less possibility of an exit for a disgruntled minority investor than does the law applicable
to closely-held corporations which, at least in theory, are supposed to lock in capital to a
greater degree than other business forms. Development of an appropriate balance in the
complex area of LLC dissolution then remains another item on the unfinished agenda for
law reform.236
VI.
Conclusion
In the space of only a few years, limited liability companies have come to rival
corporations as the form of choice for the closely-held business. This is made clear by
current data on business filings. Practicing lawyers have embraced this flexible business
form, understanding that from both a tax and business perspective it offers clients many
advantages. Academic commentators have largely ignored the sea change in choice of
business form that these numbers confirm. Law teachers, casebook authors, bar
examiners and law publishers act as if partnerships, rather than LLCs, are still the major
alternative to corporations. This has created significant costs through suboptimal legal
education and neglected legal scholarship.
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Law students, the next generation of lawyers, are being poorly served by the
present state of affairs. By and large they are leaving law school without an
understanding of the details or the importance of this hybrid business form. The absence
of significant amounts of academic research into limited liability companies has also left
largely unexplored a number of basic policy and interpretive issues about the law
governing this growingly important business form.
The widespread acceptance of limited liability companies in the business world
cries out for greater notice. Academics remain in denial. While there are explanations
and rationalizations for this, there are few legitimate excuses for the prevailing state of
affairs. Law teachers, law schools, publishers and bar examiners need to move rapidly to
raise LLCs to their rightful place in legal education and legal study.

APPENDIX
This Appendix sets out the raw data on corporate and LLC filings by state for the
years 2002 and 2003. Most of the data is taken from 2003 and 2004 International
Association of Commercial Administrators, Annual Report of Jurisdictions. Each of
these reports contained two years’ data for most (but not all) of the reporting
jurisdictions. Thus the 2003 Report contained data for 2001 and 2002; the 2004 Report
contained data for 2002 and 2003. The 2002 data should have been identical in both
reports. Surprisingly, 15 states reported different data for 2002 in the two reports. Where
that occurred, to be consistent I have used the 2002 data reported in the 2004 IACA
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Report, though in at least two cases (North and South Dakota), it appears that this may
not be the most reliable of the two figures.237
Some states did not report data to IACA. In those cases I have obtained the data
from some other source. Footnotes to the data indicate each source relied upon when the
source was not one of the two IACA Reports.

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Dist. of Columbia238
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois239
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky240
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts

2002 Data on Business Filings
Domestic
Foreign
Corporations
Corporations
6,273
2,816
844
561
11,515
2,596
5,956
1,715
78,935
10,945
19,144
2,428
2,532
3,337
36,256
904
4,207
[incl. in Domestic]
135,578
6,458
31,787
3,429
3,030
1,008
2,732
1,396
42,950
3,512
11,237
2,441
4,338
1,651
4,547
1,702
6,926
2,693
6,267
2,042
2,592
1,118
16,867
4,037
12,544
3,153

237

See discussion supra at ___.

238

DC data from public records search on LEXIS. Includes non-profits.

239

LLCs (Domestic
and Foreign)
8,384
1,239
21,923
5,161
37,429
21,010
25,847
47,726
3,281
38,639
24,186
3,778
4,309
15,675
11,283
4,863
5,819
10,903
16,593
1,984
17,149
7,465

IL data obtained through e-mails from Robert Durchholz, Dept. of Business Services, Illinois Secretary
of State’s Office (July 21 and 22, 2004).

240

KY Secretary of State Annual Business Filing Statistics,
http://www.kysos.com/BUSSER/BUSFIL/annualstatistics.asp (visited 7/13/04).
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Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma241
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina242
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas243
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona244

20,964
13,254
4,375
12,550
2,120
2,966
28,612
1,680
25,543
2,259
77,650
20,975
989
15.095
6,771
8,710
18,159
2,403
8,934
14,954
7,143
48,188
10,303
778
19,232
12,069
1,320
5,780
2,269

4,145
1,946
1,569
[incl. in Domestic]
1,304
1,177
2,093
1,171
3,986
1,507
5,279
5,166
1,350
3,204
1,880
2,123
3,937
1,057
3,200
9,535
2,109
8,131
1,766
895
4,660
3,106
1,642
1,584
1,341

2003 Data on Business Filings
Domestic
Foreign
Corporations
Corporations
6,037
2,482
870
543
13,075
2,483

30,964
9,055
5,774
16,515
N/A
2,663
16,663
5,092
32,854
4,406
34,193
18,158
900
26,575
8,784
13,249
13,302
2,681
12,643
5,185
7,267
32,953
13,215
1,863
19,599
15,313
2,618
18,192
2,914

LLCs (Domestic
and Foreign)
10,418
1,883
28,762

241

OK data obtained through e-mail from James Martin, Oklahoma Secretary of State’s office, July 19,
2004.
242

SC data obtained from public records search on LEXIS.

243

Includes non-profits.

244

2003 AZ data from Arizona Corporation Commission website, <www.cc.state.az.us>
(“Records”/”Information on Active Corporations”/”Statistics”).
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Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Dist. of Columbia245
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho246
Illinois247
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky248
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan249
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota250
245

5,897
83,763
16,976
2,498
32,180
3,547
161,559
32,311
3,195
3,055
44,348
11,184
4,384
4,419
6,799
5,694
2,639
17,031
11,941
20,780
13,545
4,170
12,132
2,537
3,017
29,120
1,737
22,198
2,370
78,104
21,841
13,914

1,668
9,933
2,407
3,176
843
[incl. in Domestic]
6,521
3,210
1,199
1,549
3,387
2,448
1,380
1,611
2,360
1,928
1,020
3,916
2,974
2,216
1,862
1,434
[incl. in Domestic]
1,419
1,078
1,978
1,380
4,126
1,495
5,169
5,229
11,270

6,443
45,274
19,383
25,255
49,551
4,434
62,406
30,806
4,988
5,575
21,450
13,707
5,902
7,067
12,928
20,121
3,224
21,980
9,999
36,495
13,765
6,938
21,318
5,740
3,469
21,011
6,423
40,714
5,769
40,768
22,604
4,290

DC data from public records search on LEXIS. Includes non-profits.

246

2003 Idaho data from Idaho Secretary of State web site, Business Entities,
<www.idsos.state.id.us/corp/bestats.htm>.

247

IL data obtained through e-mails from Robert Durchholz, Dept. of Business Services, Illinois Secretary
of State’s Office (July 21 and 22, 2004).

248

KY Secretary of State Annual Business Filing Statistics,
http://www.kysos.com/BUSSER/BUSFIL/annualstatistics.asp (visited 7/13/04).

249

2003 MI data from Mich. Dept. of Labor & Economic Growth website,
<www.michigan.gov/cis/0,1607,7-154-10557_12901_12923-37342--,00.html>.

250

See discussion of questionable accuracy of these figures, supra __.
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Ohio
Oklahoma251
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina252
South Dakota253
Tennessee
Texas254
Utah
Vermont255
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

13,866
6,588
8,912
17,888
2,337
8,599
15,379
7,209
46,694
7,785
1,217
19,337
12,394
1,455
5,643
1,977

2,735
1,575
2,168
3,055
969
2,944
9,666
2,131
8,413
2,134
1,093
4,511
3,161
2,812
1,528
1,394

251

31,147
10,250
17,469
16,472
3,629
15,020
6,264
8,704
35,285
13,148
2,262
24,673
18,917
3,913
22,229
3,124

OK data obtained through e-mail from James Martin, Oklahoma Secretary of State’s office, July 19,
2004.
252

SC data obtained from public records search on LEXIS.

253

See discussion of questionable accuracy of these figures, supra __.

254

Includes non-profits.

255

2003 VT data from Vermont Secretary of State website, “New Business Start-Ups”,
<www.sec.state.vt.us/tutor/dobiz/numbers.htm>.
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